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Abstract
This article has two interrelated aims. First, the article goes beyond law and places 
the discussions on nationality in the broader literature on citizenship, also drawing 
on social sciences, political theory and moral philosophy. The ensuing conceptual, 
historical and multi-disciplinary account highlights the long pedigree of the idea of 
citizenship, the manifold conceptions of citizenship that have developed over time 
(including supra-national, sub-national and transnational citizenship). The article 
demonstrates how the changing spatialities of citizenship culminated in a focus 
on the nation-state, and the emergence of legal citizenship or nationality, reflect-
ing the legal bond between an individual and a state. It was also noted that in sev-
eral respects the parameters of nationality keep changing. More particularly, four 
developments have been highlighted that circumscribe the sovereign right of states 
to determine who are their nationals, both legally and through de facto pressures. 
Secondly, this contribution provides the overarching framework for the special issue 
while identifying the salient discussion points regarding nationality and interna-
tional law that will be teased out in the articles of the special issue. The article ends 
with a brief overview of the articles that make up the special issue.
Keywords (Legal and substantive) citizenship · Membership of polity · Nation-
state · Shifting spatialities · Legal bond between state and individual · Statelessness · 
Dual nationality · Rights
1 Introduction
This introductory article to NILR’s special issue focused on nationality and inter-
national law has two interrelated aims. First, the article goes beyond law and places 
the discussions on nationality in the broader literature on citizenship, also drawing 
on social sciences, political theory and moral philosophy. The ensuing conceptual, 
historical and multi-disciplinary account highlights the long pedigree of the idea of 
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citizenship, the manifold conceptions of citizenship that have developed over time 
(including supra-national, sub-national and transnational citizenship) and its rel-
evance for a good understanding of nationality.1 Secondly, this contribution provides 
the overarching framework for the special issue while identifying the salient discus-
sion points regarding nationality and international law that will be teased out in the 
articles of the special issue.
A recurring theme throughout this article is the extent to which questions about 
the core notion of nationality, and the special bond that is supposed to represent 
between a natural person and a state, can be seen to inform choices about modes 
of acquisition and legitimate instances of deprivation, as well as rights and duties 
‘reserved’ for nationals.2 Indeed, the type of criteria set for acquisition of national-
ity arguably allows one to reflect on the bond nationality is supposed to represent, 
while the protections reserved for nationals similarly offer some indication of the 
nature of that bond.3 The importance of these rights and additional protection layers 
contingent on nationality furthermore signal the importance of having a national-
ity. However, when (human) rights are increasingly detached from nationality, what 
explains the sustained vigor of the fight against statelessness, the increasing recogni-
tion of a human right to a nationality and the limited possibilities for deprivations of 
nationality (also when fighting terrorism)? All of the above themes tie in with con-
troversies and challenges regarding dual or even multiple nationalities, both from the 
perspective of public and private international law. Another central theme, not only 
for this article but also for the special issue as a whole, concerns the implications of 
the changed circumstances of the current mobile world with its multiple migration 
streams, as compared to the times when nationality as a legal category was con-
ceived, and most people lived and died in the area where they were born. To what 
extent and in what way do these changed circumstances affect the way we under-
stand nationality, the special bond it is supposed to reflect (including the degree to 
which it can be commodified), and its ongoing relevance as connecting factor for 
rights in international law.
The article is structured in five parts. The first part (Sect. 2) provides a historical 
conceptual account of the development of the multi-dimensional notion of citizen-
ship and its shifting spatialities, until the era in which the nation-state became the 
central point of reference, and nationality as legal concept emerged. The state may 
still be the central point of reference, the reality of multiple levels of governance 
1 Liebich (2010) highlights in this respect that nationality laws and changes in this respect are inspired 
by (changing) conceptions of citizenship. Note that in the literature at times the distinction is made 
within the legal field between citizenship and nationality with the former referring to the status and rights 
in terms of national law (within a particular state), whereas the latter would concern the status and rights 
in terms of international law, see, inter alia, Rubenstein (2004), p. 3.
2 This close interrelation is nicely captured by Crawford (2012) who argues that: ‘nationality is a legal 
bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sen-
timents, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’, p. 513.
3 The institute of diplomatic protection may not translate in an actual right of nationals, it does constitute 
an additional layer of protection for nationals, and is thus similarly relevant for the study of nationality in 
international law.
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translate into multiple, interrelated levels of citizenship, including EU citizenship. 
The first part thus clarifies the terminological choices made in this article,4 more 
particularly regarding the use of the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’. The sec-
ond part (Sect. 3) continues with a focus on the state as the (most) relevant political 
community, and further elaborates on the multi-dimensional notion of citizenship 
in reference to membership of the state. Subsequently, the analysis of the third part 
(Sect.  4) zooms in on nationality as the legal bond between individual and state, 
while taking note on the one hand of the impact of the expanding human rights para-
digm, constraining state sovereignty in ever more domains, and on the other the real-
ity of extensive migration, resulting in a ‘mobile world’. The analysis in this part 
takes up four interrelated themes, namely requirements for acquisition of nationality 
(4.1), the ensuing rights/protections and obligations (4.2), the right to a nationality/
fight against statelessness (4.3) and dual nationality (4.4). In view of the respective 
focus of the following articles,5 the discussion here will be more elaborate on (shifts 
in) rights and obligations that hinge on nationality. Some concluding observations 
(Sect. 5) on the lines developed in this article are followed by a fifth part (Sect. 6) 
which explains the composition of the special issue.
2  A Historical Conceptual Account of the Notion of Citizenship 
and Its Relation to ‘Nationality’
The notion of ‘citizenship’ has triggered a burgeoning literature from a wide variety 
of disciplines, including political theory, sociology, political philosophy, and law. 
Notwithstanding the divergent points of view that are visible in that literature, broad 
agreement about the core meaning of citizenship does emerge. Citizenship refers to 
membership of a polity, of a political community, and thus revolves around ques-
tions of inclusion and—as the other side of the coin—exclusion.6 Another central 
theme throughout the literature is the fundamental role of equality in relation to 
citizenship, not only the entitlement of citizens to equal rights, but also the expand-
ing role of the prohibition of discrimination in relation to access and deprivation of 
citizenship.7
The state may still be the dominant point of reference for discussions of citizen-
ship, the notion citizenship has ancient origins.8 A terminological clarification is 
called for prior to delving into a historical account of the shifts over time of the 
(spatiality of the) most relevant political community. The literature reveals that some 
authors use the terms citizenship and nationality interchangeably, while others use 
4 In line with the overall lack of consistency in the literature, other authors in this special issue may use 
the terms differently. That is each time explained in each respective article.
5 The thematic analysis will each time make cross-references to the (most) relevant contributions in this 
special issue on the topic concerned.
6 Joppke (2017), p. 392; Shachar et al. (2017), p. 5.
7 Rubenstein (2004), pp. 5–6.
8 Some even go back to first permanent settlements in the Neo-lithic period: inter alia, Diener (2017) p. 
37.
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both terms to describe the relationship between an individual and the state, but in 
reference to different legal forums: citizenship would concern the national legal 
forum, whereas nationality the international legal forum.9 As will be explained more 
fully below, non-legal disciplines distinguish between various dimensions of citizen-
ship,10 one of which concerns the legal bond between an individual and a state, the 
others capture substantive citizenship. In this article the term ‘nationality’ is used 
when referring to the legal bond between an individual and the state, while ‘citizen-
ship’ denotes the broader term, also including the other dimensions of membership.
Importantly, throughout the rescaling of citizenship over time, in the sense that 
citizenship was defined in relation to varied politico-territorial structures (city-polis, 
empire, nation-state etc.), there have always been alternative scales of citizenship. In 
the words of Diener: ‘communities of belonging and obligation have existed outside 
and across the dominant politico-territorial structures of all eras’.11 This reality of 
intersecting, multiple levels of community12 and membership is ever more visible at 
present with power shifting away from the state to the local, regional and suprana-
tional level,13 translating into multi-level governance.
The historical conceptual enquiry first turns to the shifting spatialities of the 
polity or political community (2.1), to subsequently elaborate on the meaning and 
underlying rational of ‘membership’ (2.2).
2.1  The Changing Spatialities of ‘Political Community’14
As was already highlighted above, historical accounts of thinking in terms of poli-
ties, of politico-territorial structures and membership thereof reveal that the con-
tours of the polity have rescaled over time in a non-linear fashion.15 Strikingly, while 
there have always been alternative ‘communities of belonging and obligation’, the 
most central reference points for citizenship have had a geographic basis.16 Remark-
able differences in the scale of the relevant territorial structures can be noted.
14 In this historical overview the focus will be on Europe, because the central point of reference, the 
nation-state was originally devised in Western Europe and later, more particularly after 1815 spread 
across the world (for a detailed discussion on the basis of an extensive dataset comprising 145 states: 
Wimmer and Feinstein (2010)). Various trajectories of nation-state creation have been distinguished, 
such as (de)colonisation (Laakso and Olukoshi (1996), pp. 12–16), the collapse of land-based empires, 
nationalist secession (Yugoslavia, Mexico), and unification movements (Germany, Yemen). Wimmer and 
Feinstein identify an ‘imitation process driven by the extra-ordinary success and global dominance of the 
first nation-states’ (Wimmer and Feinstein (2010), p. 785) while pointing to the required shift in the bal-
ance of power to enable nation-state creation: ibid).
15 For detailed accounts of these historical developments, see Diener (2017), p. 38 and Bosniak (2000).
16 Bauböck and Giraudon (2009), p. 448; Bloemraad et al. (2008), p. 154. Diener (2017) refers in this 
respect to the ‘dominant politico-territorial structures of all eras’, p. 38.
9 Rubenstein (2004), p. 3.
10 McMahon (2012), pp. 2–3; Bloemraad et al. (2008), pp. 154–155. See also Bauböck (2010), pp. 847–
848.
11 Diener (2017), p. 38.
12 Shachar et al. (2017), p. 7.
13 See, inter alia, Sassen (2002), p. 277. See also the exploration of a global and cosmopolitan citizen-
ship in Rubenstein and Adler (2000), p. 519; Linklater (2002), p. 323.
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Ideas of citizenship were already visible in the permanent settlements follow-
ing the Neolithic revolution, especially as these settlements created (hierarchically) 
organised communities and the development of duties and tasks towards the com-
munity.17 Another noticeable stage concerns the city-states or the polis of ancient 
Greece, which had clearly defined, and restricted citizenship, with noticeable differ-
ences between Sparta and Athene in terms of the distribution of that citizenship. As 
the Roman empire had an altogether different size again, this had implications not 
only for the multi-ethnicity of its citizenship but also, relatedly, for the need for the 
notion of citizenship to be unifying.18
Since the state—in social science lingo often ‘the nation-state’—is still the cen-
tral reference point for discussions about citizenship, it is relevant to look into the 
history of state formation, more particularly the transition from feudalism in the 
Middle Ages to the modern nation-state.19 Typical for feudalism was the lack of cen-
tralized power, notwithstanding the pyramid structure that feudalism entailed. The 
land one obtained in lieu for fealty was rather conceived as private property, and the 
basis for the exercise of full powers. Furthermore, these lands were not connected 
to a particular national identity, and the lord-vassal structure was not determined by 
ethnicity.
The transition to the modern state required (1) the determination and recogni-
tion of precise boundaries, and the related identification of bounded territories, (2) 
sufficient centralization of these territories, reflected in centralized institutions, (3) 
combined with a sense of nationhood, a sense that the people living in that territory 
form a community. Two particular wars between the 14th and 17th century were 
especially ‘formative’ in relation to the emergence of states as bounded territories, 
wielding sovereignty over these territories, and the emergence of a sense of nation-
hood.20 The Hundred Years War between France and England 1337–1453 gave rise 
to conceptions of the respective nation-hoods, and planted the seeds of what later 
would develop into nationalism. The 30 Years War resulted in the adoption of the 
watershed treaty on the Peace of Westphalia 1648, which basically codified the sys-
tem of statehood as we know it today,21 heralding a state centric world order, com-
posed of territorially based sovereign states.22 As Brubaker highlighted, with the 
Peace of Westphalia the earth surface was divided into a set of mutually exclusive, 
17 Scarre (2005), p. 186; Gebel (2002), pp. 313–224. Interestingly, the first settlements following this 
Neolithic revolution occurred in South West Asia already 11000 BC, while in Europe only around 6500 
BC.
18 See also infra on the interrelation between the definition of citizenship and the ensuing rights: Roman 
citizenship was much thinner, in the sense that it yielded less entitlements, and protections (mostly a 
judicial safeguard and the rule of law).
19 See also Diener (2017), pp. 37–45; Habib (1975), p. 15; Wimmer and Feinstein (2010).
20 See Rise of the Nation-State, http://blogs .spsk1 2.net/8576/files /2015/04/Day-.5-rise-of-natio n-state 
s-readi ng.pdf (accessed September 2018).
21 The Peace of Westphalia enshrined several foundational norms of international law, more particularly 
states’ sovereign immunity, equality of states, and the doctrine of non-intervention.
22 Falk (2002) referring to the emergence of modern system of sovereign states and of a state centric 
world order, composed of territorially based sovereign states, pp. 311–312. See also Insin and Turner 
(2002), p. 6.
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bounded territorial jurisdictions, implying that the world’s population was divided 
into a set of bounded and mutually exclusive citizenries and—with the emergence of 
the institution of ‘nationality’—nationalities.23
On the basis of these foundational principles, the required centralisation took 
place from the 17th century onwards, and especially in the 18th and 19th century, 
first by absolute monarchs.24 Diener highlights in this respect that the foundations of 
the modern state were provided by the capacity to demarcate land and identify peo-
ple as belonging to one state.25 The centralisation was further bolstered by the large 
scale capacity of taxation, and coercive control of their population through advanced 
bureaucracies. Interestingly, the control and repression that went hand in hand with 
this centralisation move was also used to nurture nationalism since the King pro-
claimed to act for the good of the nation. Put differently, through the construction of 
meaningful political communities, loyalty to the state was ensured and state power 
was consolidated.26
The idea of citizenship as reflecting loyalty, deep commitment and allegiance was 
thus clearly visible in relation to the emerging nation-state. Through the 17th–19th 
centuries a shift took place from loyalty to the King, to loyalty to the political com-
munity, the nation, especially with the rise of popular sovereignty (democracy).27 
The 18th century enlightenment and the growing emphasis on rights, and particu-
larly equality and equal rights, further shaped thinking in terms of citizenship as 
referring to equal citizens, as citizens entitled to equal rights.28
Actual nationality laws were codified for the first time in the early 19th century.29 
The creation of the institution of nationality was triggered by the need to define 
one’s own, when states were recognized as bounded territories with sovereign pow-
ers in their respective territories and international law identified state responsibili-
ties in relation to ‘one’s own’. States’ limited resources make it indeed increasingly 
important that persons are allocated to a particular territory and state, so that closure 
can be exercised in relation to the ‘others’—particularly the poor ‘others’,30 and the 
control of the flow of persons across state borders is ensured.31
23 Brubaker (1992), p. 22.
24 This centralization was first realized by Spain, then by the UK and France.
25 Diener (2017), p. 44.
26 See also Habib (1975), p. 15. See also Barkey and Parikh (1991), p. 530: ‘The state gained power over 
the population through coercion but was then able to gain their consent as well by making them citizens 
entitled to certain rights from the state’.
27 Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) discuss this development as self-rule in the name of a nation of equal 
citizens, p. 764.
28 The American and French revolutions linked notions of popular sovereignty and fundamental rights, 
thus giving substance to the institution of citizenship: see also Brubaker (1992), pp. 36–39.
29 Brubaker (1992), pp. 35 et seq.
30 See also Brubaker (1992), p. 181. Interestingly this closure against migrant poor was already visible 
in 15th–16th century Germany but then at the level of the cities, at a time when the municipalities had 
high degree of autonomy and thus power (Brubaker (1992), pp. 64–65, 68: the responsibility for the poor 
only shifting to the state of Germany in the 19th century).
31 Brubaker (1992), pp. 25–27.
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2.1.1  Changing Spatiality of Citizenship: On‑Going Developments
Until today the central reference point of citizenship, the most relevant ‘political 
community’, remains the (nation-)state, but it is obvious that various on-going devel-
opments imply a re-alignment of citizenship. Traditionally, the state represented the 
key institutional order, also because it had a central role in the facilitation and regu-
lation of the industrial, educational and cultural sector.32 However, in the meantime 
the lives of people are increasingly determined by policies and practices that are 
not set by the state. The manifold developments in this respect have also triggered 
reconceptualisations of citizenship. Two developments are highlighted here.
Firstly, powers that were traditionally held by states have been shifted towards 
regional and local governments (decentralisation) and towards international organi-
sations (supranationalism). The resulting multi-level governance has gone hand in 
hand with the recognition of multiple, intersecting memberships.33 EU citizenship is 
particularly noteworthy in this respect. While EU citizenship is attached to national 
citizenship of one of the Member States, and these states in principle retain virtual 
complete freedom (see below) to decide the requirements for acquisition, the status 
of EU citizenship has increased the interdependence of nationality policies of the 
Member States.34 Furthermore, whereas EU citizenship aims to construct a Euro-
pean identity, and can thus been seen to undermine the link between nationality/
citizenship on the one hand and the traditional nation-state on the other,35 EU citi-
zenship’s residence rights do facilitate naturalisation in the Member State of resi-
dence.36 Finally, and as will be argued more fully below, several key rights of EU 
citizens point to the crucial importance of residence and voting rights for the effec-
tive realisation of membership, more particularly the right to enter and reside, and 
the right to vote (in local and European elections).37
Secondly, the changes of the international order towards ‘global governance’ has 
resulted in the recognition of the growing role of non-state actors (not only vari-
ous types of international organisations38 but also transnational corporations, NGO’s 
etc.), and their actual impact on the lives of people. These changes are further 
36 Kochenov (2010), p. 3.
37 Kochenov (2011) on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on EU cit-
izenship rights referring to the cases of Rottmann (Case C-135/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104), Ruiz Zam-
brano (Case C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124) and McCarthy (Case C-434/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:277), 
and the extent to which it recognizes EU citizenship rights also when no border has been crossed, can 
be argued to rethink the boundaries of the community and thus also the nature of the community. EU 
citizenship is arguably less centrally concerned with free movement rights and economic integration but 
rather with the recognition of the central importance of fundamental rights, p. 55.
38 For an elaborate review of the enormous range of ‘international organisations’ and their position, and 
role, see Klabbers (2015).
32 Sassen (2002), p. 279.
33 Bauböck and Giraudon (2009), p. 448. See also McMahon (2012), pp. 7–8.
34 Kochenov (2010), p. 2. See also Oosterom-Stapels (2018) in this special issue.
35 Rostek and Davies (2006), pp. 5–6.
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eroding the position of the state as reference point for membership, for ‘citizen-
ship’,39 triggering arguments about post-national, and cosmopolitan citizenship.40
In the end, and notwithstanding the recognition that governance is performed at 
many levels,41 it remains justified to dedicate a special issue to nationality, referring 
to the legal bond between an individual and the state/nation-state, since nationality 
can still be considered the master status.42 As the following discussion on the rights 
that are contingent on nationality will reveal, nationality comes with core member-
ship rights (rights to enter and reside, voting rights), that form the requisite basis for 
the effective enjoyment of (other) fundamental rights.
2.2  Membership: Rationale, Criteria and Contours of the Political Community
Turning to the second element of the definition of citizenship, namely ‘member-
ship’, citizenship is supposed to reflect a special bond with the political community 
concerned, one that makes the person possessing it deserving of the rights, and enti-
tlements contingent on membership. There is indeed a close interrelation between 
the nature of the community, the criteria for membership and the rights contingent 
on membership: the one informs the other, while the latter confirms the former and 
vice versa. At the highest level of abstraction, membership of a political community 
requires and presupposes a certain commitment, loyalty, or allegiance.43
Nevertheless, the shifts in spatiality of the political community, go hand in hand 
with shifts in the nature of the community—noted above—and entail different mark-
ers that are considered relevant as proxy for this (assumed) commitment and loyalty. 
The earliest versions of citizenship were not based on kinship (ethnicity), rather they 
were residence based, and the related consent to be bound by the same rules. This 
was clearly visible in the permanent settlements that emerged after the Neolithic 
revolution. Similarly, the early city-states of ancient Greece were not about kinship, 
rather about men subject to the same rules, and rights and duties of political par-
ticipation. During the time of the Roman Empire, Roman citizenship was not ethnic 
based either, but aimed at building loyalty throughout the empire that was per defini-
tion multi-ethnic.44 During the Middle Ages, feudalism was decidedly not about an 
overarching community, let alone in the ethnic sense, but about fragmented, recipro-
cal personal relationships tied to land, and thus to the place where one lived. The 
subsequent centralization of power by the absolute monarchs, made people born in 
the territory into ‘subjects of the monarch’.45 As was highlighted above, over time 
the Kings wanted to strengthen the loyalty of their subjects by justifying their actions 
39 Benhabib (2005), p. 673. See also Habermas (2000), who refers to the ‘crisis of territorially circum-
scribed nation-state formation’, p. 447.
40 See also Sassen (2002), p. 280; Benhabib (2005), p. 675.
41 Rubenstein (2007), p. 102; Smith (2002), p. 113: ‘the idea of citizenship will increasingly be severed 
[…] from membership in some single, titular sovereign political community’.
42 Joppke (2007), pp. 37–38.
43 Rubenstein (2007), p. 102. See also Saffran (1997), p. 323.
44 See also Diener (2017), p. 38.
45 See Honohan and Rougier (2018) in this special issue.
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as being for the good of the nation, thus again invoking the sense of an overarching 
community. The following democratization wave implied a further shift from sub-
jects of a monarch to citizens of a self-governing nation. It is exactly in relation to 
the emerging nation-states that different visions about what holds the nation together 
have been developed. It is here that the often referred to distinction between ethnic 
and civic nationalism finds its place.
3  Citizenship as Membership in a Nation‑State: Legal 
and Substantive Citizenship
Since the state, ‘the nation-state’, is still the central reference point for discussions 
about citizenship, the obvious relation to ‘nationalism’, national identity and nation-
hood needs to be acknowledged.46 Indeed, citizenship has been argued to be bound 
up with nationhood and national identity.47 Importantly, the definition of ‘a nation’ 
is a question of choice, of ‘public narratives’: a nation can be defined on an ethnic 
ethnographic basis but also on a more inclusive, open, voluntarist basis.48 Whereas 
an ethnic nation is defined by common language, culture and traditions and is rather 
ascribed, a civic nation is constituted by all those who subscribe to a political creed 
and consent to be bound by the same rules of conduct and principles.49 In the lat-
ter sense, the state, membership of the state, the common citizenship, creates the 
nation, whereas in the former sense the pre-existing nation creates the state.50
Similarly, in relation to the state as reference point different theories of citizenship 
have been developed, reflecting different visions of the state, and of the community 
making up the state. Speaking to the interrelation between the underlying rational 
of citizenship, the vision of the community making up the state and conditions 
for acquiring citizenship, these different theories translate in differences regarding 
modes of acquiring citizenship, as is particularly visible in naturalization require-
ments.51 Relatedly, these different theories of citizenship also translate in different 
approaches to optimizing the integration of migrants. Theories often distinguished 
in this respect include communitarian, republican and liberal theories.52 As com-
munitarian theories see the state as a community of character, the emphasis is more 
on sameness (and assimilation), whereas liberal theories focus more on the protec-
tion of the individual, thus leaving more scope for different ethnic identities as long 
46 Orgad (2017), p. 345.
47 Brubaker (1992), p 182.
48 Brubaker (2004), pp. 117, 123. See also Miller (1995) where he points out that a nation’s distinctive 
character can be to encompass a diversity of ethnic groups and Anderson (2017) who sees nations as 
imagined communities.
49 Orgad (2017), pp. 345–346.
50 Ignatieff (1987).
51 See Orgad (2017), pp. 344–345.
52 See also Honohan (2017).
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as there is a commitment to liberal values and institutions.53 A republican theory on 
citizenship is all about active citizenship and participation in public life, and thus 
screens applicants for naturalization on their civic virtues, loyalty to constitution and 
integration efforts.54
When analysing citizenship as referring to the special bond between a citizen and 
a nation-state, different dimensions of citizenship have been distinguished. Citizen-
ship as full (and equal) membership of the state,55 is further subdivided in citizen-
ship as legal status on the one hand and citizenship as socio-political membership 
on the other. Put differently, in addition to legal citizenship (or nationality), referring 
to the legal bond between an individual and a state, also a more substantive citizen-
ship can be identified.56 The legal status dimension triggers questions about crite-
ria and procedures of acquisition of legal citizenship or nationality.57 Substantive 
citizenship not only encompasses the rights and duties contingent on (legal) citizen-
ship, but also refers to questions of participation, identity and belonging.58 Whereas 
different authors identify slightly different dimensions,59 there are clearly recurring 
themes, as well as an acknowledgement that these dimensions are interrelated.60 
While rights, equal rights, are an essential attribute of citizenship, this special mem-
bership is not only a matter of taking part (politically and otherwise), but also of 
creating a collective identity and feeling part (belonging).61
53 Honohan (2017), p. 90; Gans (2017), p. 116. Orgad (2017) correctly distinguishes between two types 
of liberalism. One concerns liberalism as modus vivendi, allowing plural ways of life as long as one is 
committed to obey the laws and to peaceful coexistence. The other considers liberalism as an ethical pro-
ject and also require a commitment to liberal values and institutions (muscular liberalism), pp. 344–345.
54 Bauböck (2010), p. 852.
55 Rubenstein (2004), p. 27.
56 Citizenship has been described as ‘a collection of rights, duties and opportunities for participation that 
define the extent of socio-political membership’ (Rubenstein and Adler (2000), p. 522).
57 Brubaker (1992), p. 21. See infra and see Honohan and Rougier (2018) and De Groot and Vonk 
(2018) in this special issue.
58 In terms of citizenship and boundaries: citizenship identifies both legal boundaries (status/rights), and 
social boundaries (identity and belonging).
59 Contra Goodman (2014), critical about using citizenship as a catch all phrase for describing and 
rights, and status and identity, p. 19.
60 See also the introduction by Shaw and Stiks (2013) in the volume they edited on Citizenship Rights 
in which they refer to Joppke (status, rights, identity), Wiener (access, rights, belonging), Bauböck (prac-
tices, rights and membership), Bellamy (participation, rights, belonging) and Benhabib (collective iden-
tity, social rights, political membership). Bloemraad (2017) distinguishes between status/access, rights, 
participation, identity/belonging. Her account focuses strongly on bounded territory—state control over 
resources—equal access to right, p. 525.
61 See also Bloemraad et al. (2008), p. 154.
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4  Nationality: The Legal Bond Between an Individual and a State
Without denying the importance of various ongoing controversies about the dimen-
sions of belonging and identity,62 this special issue of the Netherlands International 
Law Review will, obviously, focus on the legal facets of citizenship. The remainder 
of this introductory article will provide the overarching framework for the articles 
of this special issue,63 introducing the themes developed by them, where relevant 
including explicit cross references. Throughout, the interrelations between the vari-
ous discussion points are highlighted. This contribution furthermore supplements 
the other articles with an explicit discussion of the shifts in rights that are contingent 
on nationality, while underscoring the central importance of citizenship as a status 
that guarantees equal rights for all citizens.64
Several pressing questions arise in relation to nationality, as referring to the legal 
bond between an individual and the state.65 This part will address several of these, 
often interwoven, questions. Questions about the meaning/rational of this special 
membership and the related delimitation of membership (4.1) are closely interwoven 
with the identification of the effects of this status. The (shifts regarding the) rights 
(including entitlements and protection mechanisms) (4.2) determine the importance 
of this status, and thus also the relevance of the fight against statelessness (4.3) 
and the acceptability of deprivations of nationality. All of the above considerations 
inform the debate about the acceptability of dual (multiple) nationality (4.4).
As was highlighted above, the emergence of nationality as legal status happened at 
the intersection of various developments in the 17th–18th century: the emergence of the 
nation-state, the division of the earth surface into a set of mutually exclusive territorial 
jurisdictions, each of which sovereign within its territory, and the development of the 
administrative capacity to demarcate land and identify people as belonging to a state.66 
All of the states thus demarcated have a vital interest in controlling migration across 
one’s borders, and thus also to determine who belongs to the nation.67 In the words of 
62 See in this respect the broader debates on how to turn migrants into members (inter alia, Baldi and 
Goodman (2015)), and relatedly the different types of membership and engagement that a sate seeks 
(Goodman (2014), distinguishing between national and state identity). In this regard, it is interesting to 
notice that integration requirements often feature as prerequisites for obtaining nationality (through natu-
ralisation) while nationality is argued to increase political and civic engagement, which in turn would 
strengthen the identification with the national community, and social integration (Bloemraad (2017), p. 
544).
63 For further information on the articles contained in this special issue, and the order in which they fea-
ture, see the explanation at the end of this contribution.
64 See also Rubenstein (2004), pp. 5–6. Bloemraad (2017) correctly highlights the reality of society dis-
crimination that undermines the promise of equal rights, p. 537.
65 This special issue is indeed concerned with the nationality of natural, not legal, persons.
66 Brubaker (1992), p. 22.
67 Goodman (2014) identifies as reasons why states emphasize their sovereignty in determining who are 
its nationals because of the importance of resource allocation, and the goal of social cohesion, loyalty 
and solidarity, pp. 22–25.
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Brubaker ‘the principle and the administrative apparatus of closure are essential to the 
modern state and its project of territorial rule’.68
4.1  Acquisition of Nationality
When discussing what determines the contours of the community, the in–out cri-
teria, in relation to the nation-state, the notion of nation needs to be considered, 
more particularly: What defines a nation? What holds it together?69 The discus-
sion of membership of a political community above has already noted that when 
states set out to define ‘their own’, their nationals, one way or the other they seek to 
identify those with an attachment to the state, a certain commitment, loyalty, to the 
territory and/or its people.70 In its famous Nottebohm judgment71 the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has emphasized the relevance of an effective or genuine link 
between an individual and a state to justify a conferral of nationality on the individ-
ual concerned that needs to be respected by other states.72 According to Crawford: 
‘the decision in Nottebohm is a reflection of a fundamental concept long present in 
the materials concerning nationality on the international plane’.73 There are indeed 
ample antecedents in continental literature and decisions of national courts.74
When reflecting on the proxies that can be used to measure this link, this attach-
ment, one needs to think further about the type of bond nationality is supposed to 
capture. It has been argued that being a citizen of a state is having a stake in the 
country,75 so that one’s well-being is bound with the well-being of the state.76 Mark-
ers that have been suggested in this respect include habitual residence, having the 
center of ones interests and family ties in the state concerned.77 Arguably, having a 
stake in a state is also related to the special rights and protection mechanisms one 
is entitled to as national of that state,78 since this entails that one’s interests are pro-
foundly affected by the institutions of that state.79 Crawford posits that the ‘effective 
link’ requirement can be satisfied through residence requirements and membership 
of ethnic groups associated with the state territory.80 This in turn can be related to 
the various ways in which the nation can be conceived, as an ethnic nation or a civic 
68 Brubaker (1992), p. 24.
69 See also Anderson (2017).
70 Brubaker (1992), pp. 88–92, 122–124.
71 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4.
72 It needs to be acknowledged that some authors seek to nuance the implications of Nottebohm, as being 
specific to the case of dual nationals (Leigh (1971), p. 468).
73 Crawford (2012), p. 513.
74 See also Basdevant (1909), p. 59; German nationality (1952) 19 ILR 319.
75 See also Bauböck (2009) on ‘External Citizenship’; Tanasoca (2015), p. 40.
76 Crawford (2012) highlights in this respect that when the UN Convention on the Reduction of State-
lessness of 1961 obliges states to reduce statelessness, it relies on ‘various criteria of factual connection 
and evidence of allegiance’, p. 517.
77 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4, at 22.
78 See also de Groot (2015), p. 29.
79 Tanasoca (2015), p. 40.
80 Crawford (2012), p. 514.
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nation: as a nation built on kinship, or a nation uniting around a common political 
creed and values.81
It is often emphasized that policing the boundaries of the community making 
up the state, and thus the criteria and procedures that need to be fulfilled to obtain 
access to nationality, are one of the last vestiges of state sovereignty.82 It is, how-
ever, difficult to deny that increasingly international law also identifies constraints 
on states’ discretion in this regard. First, the ICJ’s Nottebohm judgment already indi-
cated that states cannot grant nationality without proper basis,83 in that the conferral 
of nationality needs to reflect a genuine attachment or link. The latter requirement 
remains topical, as is visible, inter alia, in relation to the controversies surrounding 
the conferral of nationality to gifted athletes, aimed at more ‘national’ success in the 
Olympics.84 Similarly, the prohibition of compulsory change of nationality/naturali-
sation, collective naturalization,85 and extraterritorial naturalisation86 can be related 
to this ‘effective link’ requirement.87
Secondly, and as will be discussed at more length below, the recognition of the 
individual right to a nationality, and the related norms aimed at countering state-
lessness,88 also exert pressure on states to confer nationality on particular individu-
als (that would otherwise be stateless). Thirdly, and in line with the central impor-
tance of the equality principle in international law, international courts have become 
increasingly critical of instances of racial discrimination in relation to the definition 
and application of criteria for the acquisition of nationality (at birth).89 The Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) established a violation 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter) because 
the new nationality law of Côte d’Ivoire retroactively stripped a particular ethnic 
group of its nationality, notwithstanding its long-standing ties with the state. The 
81 These different conceptions of the nation can be related to the different logic of inclusion in the state 
that Goodman identifies: a logic of sameness (state identity referring to kinship) versus a logic of togeth-
erness (state identity rather referring to solidarity, common plans etc.): Goodman (2014), pp. 2, 27–30.
82 Orgad (2017), p. 345. See also Wimmer (2009), pp. 257–258.
83 According to Crawford the related manipulations of the law of nationality, would amount to interna-
tionally wrongful conduct; Crawford (2012), p. 520.
84 For a more detailed account, see Wollmann (2018) in this special issue.
85 In re Rau (1930) 6 ILR 251.
86 Extraterritorial naturalisation has been described as ‘granting of citizenship to persons living in 
another country who share certain characteristics (e.g. in ethnic, religious or linguistic terms)’. For a 
detailed analysis, see Traunmuller (2013). See also Bolzano Recommendations on National Minorities 
and Inter-State Relations, OSCE HCNM (2008), Principle 11: ‘States may take preferred linguistic com-
petences and cultural, historical or familial ties into account in their decision to grant citizenship to indi-
viduals abroad. States should, however, ensure that such a conferral of citizenship respects the principles 
of friendly, including good neighbourly, relations and territorial sovereignty, and should refrain from 
conferring citizenship en masse…’. The Explanatory Note links this recommendation to the Nottebohm 
case and its requirement of ‘the existence of a genuine link’ between the state and the individual upon 
whom citizenship is conferred: Bolzano Recommendations on National Minorities and Inter-State Rela-
tions, OSCE HCNM (2008), p. 19.
87 Crawford (2012), pp. 523–524.
88 See also van Waas and Jaghai (2018), and Honohan and Rougier (2018) in this special issue.
89 Spiro (2011), pp. 721–722.
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Commission highlighted that the ethnic group concerned has an undisputable valid 
claim to Ivorian nationality because they had become ‘integral and definitive part of 
the formation of the Ivorian ethno-cultural landscape’.90 Similarly, in the Yean and 
Bosico case91 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR) did not accept 
the manipulation of the nationality law in the Dominican Republic which had the 
effect of impeding the acquisition of Dominican nationality by children of Haitian 
origin.92
Nationality is primarily acquired at birth, so as to optimize legal certainty, but can 
also be the result of naturalization, thus enabling migrants that come and settle in a 
state to obtain the nationality of that state. Birth right citizenship is bestowed on per-
sons automatically, and is not a matter of choice. Interestingly, the criteria developed 
for this birth right citizenship are considered to be proxies for characteristics that 
reflect long term loyalty and affiliation with the polity.93 Put differently, the persons 
that acquire citizenship as a birth right are assumed to be committed and loyal to the 
state concerned. Naturalisation requirements may differ from state to state, typically 
these requirements include a certain period of residence, knowledge of the language 
and the country, and an oath of loyalty. Several of these explicit requirements can 
be seen to measure attachment to the country, and solidarity.94 In this respect natu-
ralization requirements and procedures can be seen to aim at forging the connection 
between the newcomer and the polity, seeking explicit consent to be bound by rules 
of the community and proof of loyalty (what is assumed at birth).95 Authors that 
have advocated alternative criteria to acquire citizenship similarly focus on criteria 
that reflect social attachment, and social membership.96
As is further elaborated upon in the contribution of de Groot and Vonk in this 
special issue, traditionally two systems of birth right citizenship have been distin-
guished, ius soli (based on the place of birth) and ius sanguinis (based on descent). 
Ius soli systems see citizenry as a territorial community, which can be related to 
the feudal idea that those who were born on the territory where subject to the rule 
of that territory.97 The underlying idea of community is also more future oriented, 
in the sense that people born on a territory are intended to stay there and develop 
ties and commitment to the community living on that territory.98 This is exactly the 
90 The discriminatory deprivation of nationality was held to constitute a violation of Art. 5 African 
Charter: OSI v. Cote D’ Ivoire (2016) Communication 318/06 ACHPR, para. 104.
91 IACrtHR Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005), Series C No. 130.
92 See also Kesby (2012), p. 55.
93 Rodriguez (2009).
94 Orgad (2017), p. 341.
95 Bauböck et al. (2006), pp. 449–450. See also Kostakopoulou (2003), p. 88, and Orgad (2017), p. 341: 
it is about proving that you are worthy.
96 See, inter alia, Shachar (2009) who advocates in her book Birthright Lottery for a ius nexi: citizen-
ship by genuine connection to the country, which focuses on social membership as gate to political/legal 
membership; and Spiro (2011), p. 721 who calls for a presumption in favour of nationality on the basis of 
habitual residence.
97 Bauböck (2015), p. 6.
98 See also Brubaker (1992), p. 123.
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reason why settler states opted for ius soli.99 Ius sanguinis systems see citizenry 
rather as a community of descent, which builds on the assumption that kinship guar-
antees commitment, allegiance and loyalty.100 Whereas ius sanguinis is the system 
that is most widely used throughout the world,101 increasingly it is complemented 
by ius soli elements, so as to attempt to include migrants in national community.102
In regard to the naturalisation requirements, the question is always whether the 
requirements are high enough, so as to make sure that persons acquiring national-
ity have the requisite attachment and loyalty, without being too high. In the latter 
regard, political theory about the just society emphasize that long-term residents 
should have the opportunity to become full members of the polity.103 It has been 
noted that there is a pendulum back and forth in terms of requirements for migrant 
naturalisation, a movement to facilitate naturalisation is followed by sharpening 
requirements again, more particularly because of concerns about failing integra-
tion and cohesion.104 The question of dual nationality also comes up here as states 
can require as precondition for naturalisation that one relinquishes one’s existing 
nationality.105
4.2  Rights and Obligations Contingent on Nationality
This part will mainly discuss the developments that have taken place in terms of 
rights that are contingent on nationality. While important shifts have taken place 
in this respect, in that more and more rights have been detached from nationality, 
the following analysis will demonstrate that the rights that are key to membership 
in the state are still reserved for nationals. This speaks to the on-going importance 
of having a nationality and a right to nationality as well as the fight against state-
lessness. Underscoring the centrality of equality among citizens, and the intrinsic 
link between citizenship and equal rights, is the case law of international courts that 
become ever more critical about differentiations in terms of rights between birth 
right and naturalized citizens.106 It is in any event important to contrast the promise 
of equal rights that citizenship holds with the reality of often deep-seated discrimi-
nation and marginalisation of particular groups of citizens.107
99 Saffran (1997), p. 314.
100 Brubaker (1992), p. 123.
101 For further information see Honohan and Rougier (2018) in this special issue.
102 De Schutter and Ypi (2015), p. 240. However, the increasing integration concerns with third and 
fourth generation of migrants does lead to more demanding civic integration and related naturalization 
requirements: Joppke (2007), pp. 39-41.
103 De Schutter and Ypi (2015), p. 238.
104 Joppke (2007), pp. 43-44; Baldi and Goodman (2015), pp. 1154–1155.
105 See Wautelet (2018) in this special issue.
106 Inter alia, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Biao v. Denmark, Application no. 38,590/10, 
24 May 2016; ACHPR, Modise v. Botswana, Communications 97/93, 6 November 2000; ACHPR, Open 
Society Justice initiative v. Cote d’Ivoire, Communications 318/06, 27 May 2016, paras. 99-104.
107 The Roma are a prime example in this respect: Vermeersch (2014), pp. 481–482.
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When considering the obligations that used to be reserved for nationals, some of 
them have been made generally applicable to residents (the duty to pay taxes), or 
even more broadly to everyone in the jurisdiction of the state (obeying laws). The 
transition in most countries to professional armies has eliminated military duties. It 
may be so that states are said to have legitimate expectations of loyalty of their citi-
zens, international law recognizes no such obligation.108 Admittedly, several coun-
tries require an oath of loyalty or allegiance from persons seeking to naturalise,109 
but this does not tend to translate into concrete obligations.110
4.2.1  Rights, Entitlements and Protection Mechanisms (Traditionally) Reserved 
for Nationals
Nationality is in several respects an important marker for international law purposes. 
Indeed, nationality not only determines enemy status in times of war, but states are 
also entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in favour of their nationals and refuse 
extradition of their own nationals. Since the 19th century the rule of diplomatic 
protection111 was established following which one state may invoke the responsibil-
ity of a third state for an internationally wrongful act inflicted on its nationals. As 
diplomatic protection is conceived as a right of a state against another state, in the 
sense that the internationally wrongful act against the person can be constructed as 
an injury to the state itself, there needs to be a sufficient connection between the 
state exercising diplomatic protection and the individual. Nationality is supposed to 
reflect (guarantee) such a sufficient connection, or—referring to the ICJ in the Notte-
bohm case—a genuine link. In its 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection the 
International Law Commission (ILC) still clearly demands sufficient ties between 
the individual and the state, but also acknowledges the impact of globalisation and 
the growing migration streams.112
Traditionally, diplomatic protection is conceived as a right of a state that does not 
go hand in hand with a duty towards the national disadvantaged by the internation-
ally wrongful act.113 As these internationally wrongful acts will largely correspond 
to the norms found in the principal human rights treaties,114 the growing individual 
complaints rights before international courts (including treaty bodies) do reduce 
the importance of diplomatic protection.115 Nevertheless, in the several instances 
108 Boll (2005), pp. 41, 46.
109 Boll (2005), pp. 58–59.
110 See however the grounds for deprivation of nationality, some of which apply even if this would cause 
statelessness, Art. 8(3) of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961).
111 For a more comprehensive account of diplomatic protection, see Denza (2018) in this special issue.
112 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection the International Law Commission (2006) p. 8. A state can 
also exercise diplomatic protection in relation to recognized refugees and stateless persons as long as 
they are lawfully and habitually resident on its territory (tho Pesch (2015), p. 56).
113 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), 1924 PCIJ, Series A, No. 2.
114 Dugard (2009), tho Pesch (2015), p. 65.
115 See also Denza (2018) in this special issue; Dugard (2013), p. 3.
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where these international human rights are not respected and cannot effectively be 
enforced, diplomatic protection provides a possible safety net.116
Particularly important, since it also constitutes the bridge to rights and entitle-
ments within the state, is the states duty to allow their nationals entry in the state ter-
ritory.117 As the preceding historical account (on state formation) highlighted, from 
the moment states had clearly defined borders, and sovereign powers within these 
borders, questions of border control and immigration control became closely inter-
twined with states’ quest to secure their sovereignty.118 The right to enter a state, 
and the protection against being expelled, implies a right to stay, and thus a right 
to reside. This right to stay and the ‘lawful residence’ that goes along with it, was 
traditionally also a prerequisite for the enjoyment of social rights (rights to work, 
social services, health care, education, and social security).119 Active and passive 
voting rights are also traditionally limited to citizens, to persons with the nationality 
of the state concerned.120 This is clearly reflected in the framing of Article 25 of the 
UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which restricts the scope of application 
of voting rights and even of the right ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs’ 
more generally to ‘every citizen’, as opposed to ‘everyone’.
4.2.2  Rights are Increasingly Detached from ‘Nationality’
It is widely recognized that the developing human rights paradigm increasingly 
constrains state sovereignty. Particularly important in relation to a special issue on 
nationality is the fact that human rights are rights one has simply because one is a 
human being, irrespective of characteristics and generally also irrespective of legal 
status.121 The equality principle is thus ingrained in the concept of human rights 
itself, as it is in relation to rights of citizens.122
The growing list of positive obligations on states to ensure the effective protection 
of fundamental rights, could be argued to point to some level of obligation on states 
to protect their nationals when they suffer severe human rights violations at the hand 
of third states, such as in the case of the violation of peremptory norms.123 Notwith-
standing the growing support that is noted for the recognition of some duty to afford 
116 As Vermeer-Künzli (2007) underscores: in the end diplomatic protection is about the optimal protec-
tion of individuals against violations of international human rights, p. 37.
117 Rubenstein and Adler (2000), p. 525. See also Kesby (2012), p. 60.
118 See also Kesby (2012), p. 101.
119 An appendix to the European Social Charter both in its original and revised version expressly 
restricts the personal scope of application of most Charter rights to foreigners who reside and/or work 
legally on the territory of the state concerned. For an extensive discussion see O’Cinneide (2014), pp. 
288–289. See also Art. 8 of the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals 
of the Country in which They Live (195) A/RES/40/144.
120 See also Cole (2003), p. 370.
121 See also Habermas (2000) who claims that the international human rights system is an emerging 
form of citizenship beyond the state.
122 See also Rubenstein and Adler (2000) who see citizenship as the expansion of equality among citi-
zens.
123 Dugard (2013), p. 8.
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diplomatic protection to nationals subjected to serious human rights violations,124 in 
the end the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection stopped at pronouncing a 
‘recommendation to states to give due consideration to the possibility of exercising 
diplomatic protection, especially when a significant injury has occurred’.125 Admit-
tedly, in so far as national standards recognize a state duty to exercise diplomatic 
protection, this goes hand in hand with extensive discretion.126
In regard to social rights, several developments in the jurisprudence of interna-
tional courts are noteworthy. As it would be beyond the confines of this article to 
provide a comprehensive overview of this case law, merely two are highlighted. 
First, the European Committee on Social Rights has adopted an interpretation of the 
European Social Charter that increasingly—on human dignity grounds—counters 
the exclusion of illegal residents from the scope of application of the Social Charter, 
thus extending social rights even to illegal foreigners.127 Secondly, EU citizens’ free 
movement rights, entail not only the rights to enter and reside in the other EU Mem-
ber States,128 but also ever-expanding social rights.129
Also in regard to voting rights, there is an increasing call to extend voting rights 
to foreign residents. These arguments are less in terms of human rights, since human 
rights standards themselves are limited to ‘citizens’,130 but rather in terms of demo-
cratic theory. In line with the old principle ‘no taxation without representation’ and 
the more recent ‘all affected principle’, democratic legitimacy would require that 
when one is subject to obligations, one should also be allowed to take part in the 
decision making process of these rules.131 Similarly, voting rights are advocated for 
those who have a stake in the country, whose future is linked to the future of the 
country, who is affected by the government policies and actions.132 Extending voting 
rights to migrants is furthermore expected to stimulate their political participation, 
124 Dugard (2009), para. 14.
125 Art. 19 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006). See also tho Pesch (2015), p. 58.
126 See also the South African Constitutional Court in Kaunda v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa, in which the Court identifies a constitutional duty to consider request to offer diplomatic protec-
tion by citizens faced by actions by third states that violate international law, and a duty to deal appropri-
ately with these requests. The recognition of a constitutional right goes hand in hand with the conferment 
of considerable discretion on the state: see also Coombs (2005), p. 683.
127 See European Committee of Social Rights FIDH v. France, Application no. 14/2003, 8 September 
2004; DCI v. the Netherlands, Application no. 47/2008, 20 October 2009; DCI v. Belgium, Applica-
tion no. 69/2011, 23 October 2012; CEC v. the Netherlands, Application no. 990/2013, 19 July 2014; 
FEANTSA v. the Netherlands, Application 86/2012, 9 July 2014.
128 Arts. 5, 6 and 7 of the Citizen’s Rights Directive 2004/38/EC [(2004) OJ L158/77] concerning the 
right to enter and the right to reside for up to or for more than 3 months.
129 It has been noted though that these social rights entitlements cannot always be effectively enjoyed: 
see, inter alia, Pennings and Seeleib-Kaiser (2018).
130 It should be highlighted that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is not framed 
in terms of rights (of citizens) but rather as state obligations to organise elections that secure the ‘free 
expression of the will of the people’. This reference to people would seem to allow for an interpretation 
that includes non-national residents. Strikingly there exists no case law on this question, in contrast to an 
extensive jurisprudence on question of voting rights for non-resident nationals. See, Art. 3 of Protocol 
no. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
131 Beckman (2006), pp. 153–154; Groenendijk (2008), p. 5; Lenard (2015), p. 125.
132 Beckman (2006), pp. 157–160.
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which in turn is meant to enhance their integration.133 When considering state prac-
tice, in several countries developments can be identified to extend voting rights 
to migrants, but there are still considerable variations, both in terms of the level 
at which elections are opened to foreigners (local, regional and national),134 and in 
terms of the extent of the residence requirements.135
4.2.3  Nationality and the Right to Enter and Stay: The Right to Have Rights
Notwithstanding the developments of the human rights paradigm and the related 
growing detachment of rights and nationality,136 there are still rights that only per-
sons with the nationality of a state fully enjoy, more particularly rights to enter and 
stay in a state, and voting rights. What is particularly striking is that these rights can 
be argued to constitute core rights for actual, effective membership in a political 
community.
First of all, rights to entry and stay (reside) are the essential precondition to 
become a member of the polity, understood as a political community with territo-
rial bounds. Indeed, one needs a place where one can makes one’s home,137 partici-
pate politically, and exercise one’s civil, political and social rights.138 In this respect 
Hannah Arend’s famous qualification of nationality as the right to have rights can 
be understood: nationality as the precondition for the effective enjoyment of funda-
mental rights.139 As long-term resident foreign nationals obtain stronger rights of 
residence, including enhanced protection from deportation, as well as related socio-
economic rights (access to employment and family reunification), the term ‘denizen’ 
was coined to reflect a status which entitled persons to many but not all rights of full 
citizens.140
Secondly, also (national) voting rights are often highlighted as being of crucial 
importance because they provide opportunities for co-determining governance.141 
Bellamy highlights in this respect that political participation rights are the rights 
133 Groenendijk (2008), p. 5. See also Lenard (2015), pp. 122–123 who argues that collective participa-
tion in the electoral system and the shared institutions builds social cohesion. Cf. Rostek and Davies 
(2006), p. 5.
134 See the discussion of the quantitative analysis in Earnest (2015), pp. 4, 7.
135 Groenendijk (2008), p. 4. See Earnest (2015), pp. 5–6 who distinguishes 5 categories.
136 Kesby (2012), p. 94.
137 Inter alia, De Groot (2015), pp. 29–30.
138 Kesby (2012), p. 52.
139 Oman (2010), p. 281. See also Shachar (2014), pp. 114–115 who highlights that our rights remain 
fragile when we are not member of a political community. See also Somers (2008) who highlights the 
primary right of recognition, inclusion and membership in both political and civil society (social and 
political recognition), preceding the second bundle of rights consisting of civil, political, social, cultural 
etc. rights, pp. 6 and 25.
140 Turner (2016), p. 679.
141 Kesby (2012) p. 58; De Groot (2015), pp. 29–30. Smith (2002) acknowledges that with the different 
spatialities of citizenship over time—this idea of political co-determination was not always strongly pre-
sent, referring to the feudal times where it was restricted to some cities (p. 106), stronger again after the 
revolutions in the 18th century, whereas today there would be less focus on political activism and rather 
on involvement in social, economic and cultural organizations (p. 112).
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of rights as political rights secure equal access and recognition within its decision 
making and organisational structures.142 Hence, voting rights are qualified as key-
stone rights, as ‘essential prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other rights’143 and 
thus essential to secure a dignified life.
4.3  The Right to Have a Nationality and the Fight against Statelessness
As the preceding analysis demonstrated, having a nationality still greatly matters as 
it is the gate to obtaining so-called keystone rights (the right to enter and reside and 
the right to vote), that in turn enable the effective realisation of one’s civil, political, 
social, economic, and cultural rights. Put differently, nationality is the ‘bedrock for 
fulfilling and protecting our otherwise abstracted human rights’,144 thus providing 
a sense of security and belonging.145 Linking back to the historical account of the 
emergence of nationality: ‘in a world divided among exhaustive and mutually exclu-
sive jurisdictions of sovereign states, it is axiomatic that every person ought to have 
a citizenship, that every person ought to belong to one state or another’.146
Conversely, persons that are stateless tend to be described as particularly vulner-
able, since ‘being stateless renders one vulnerable to the non-observance of rights 
by state and other individuals’.147 Indeed, as was pointed out by Hanna Arendt: 
when stateless there is no political community willing and able to guarantee one’s 
rights.148 The severe predicament of stateless persons is also keenly understood 
by international human rights courts, where they equate being stateless with being 
deprived for all practical purposes of one’s rights.149
Consequently, it is not surprising that the fight against statelessness has early 
roots,150 and has been relentless. The two most prominent and interrelated strate-
gies in international law to combat statelessness are on the one hand the realisation 
of the right to a nationality, and on the other countering arbitrary deprivations of 
142 Bellamy (2008), pp. 598–590.
143 Kesby (2012), p. 69.
144 Oman (2010), pp. 279–280. See also Shachar (2014); Brubaker (1992), p. 70.
145 Citizenship is said to have a crucial bearing on the basic goods and opportunities that shape life 
chances: Brubaker (1992), p. 24.
146 Brubaker (1992), p. 30.
147 Kesby (2012), p. 62. See also IACrtHR Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005), Series 
C No. 130.
148 Arendt (1968), pp. 175–177.
149 See also IACrtHR Advisory Opinion on Naturalisation Law Costa Rica (1984) OC-4/84, para. 34. 
See also the judgement of IACrtHR Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005), Series C No. 
130, paras. 178–179 where the Court equates a denial of nationality with a denial of juridical personality, 
because it denies absolutely an individual’s condition of being a subject of rights and renders him vulner-
able to non-observance of this rights by the state and other individuals.
150 Brubaker notes the first concerns about combating ‘statelessness’ already in the 17th–18th century, 
in the sense that states were concerned that no one would be left homeless, without protection, without 
rights of residence and support (Brubaker (1992), pp. 65–66).
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nationality.151 The international law rules that are thus developing further limit state 
sovereignty regarding the acquisition and deprivation of nationality. Nevertheless, as 
the following overview will reveal, ample state discretion remains.
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights already enshrined a right to a nation-
ality (for everyone), and prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Since then 
the right to a nationality features in various international conventions, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, ICCPR), the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989, CRC), the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (1969, CERD) and the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979, CEDAW), the latter two 
conventions confirming the central importance of the prohibition of discrimination 
in this respect. It should be highlighted though that these general recognitions of 
everyone’s right to nationality does not identify on what state the responsibility lies 
to grant its nationality. The 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality152 do specify that children are to 
acquire the nationality of the country in which they are born if they do not acquire 
any other nationality.153 Furthermore, the latter Convention adds more generally as 
one of its overarching principles that ‘the rules on nationality of each State Party 
shall be based on the following principles: everyone has the right to a nationality.’154 
While this is difficult to translate in concrete benchmarks, it has an undeniable sign-
aling function. The 1997 European Convention on Nationality also gives pride of 
place to the prohibition of discrimination in relation to nationality questions where it 
stipulates that states must avoid all discrimination on grounds of sex, religion, race, 
colour, national or ethnic origin.155
Given the importance of nationality as anchor point for the effective enjoyment 
and protection of one’s rights, the right to a nationality encompasses a right to retain 
one’s nationality. Consequently, it has been long understood that international law 
limits states’ sovereign power to deprive persons of their nationality.156 The prohibi-
tion of arbitrary deprivation of nationality already featured in the Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights,157 and has been further regulated in the UN 1961 Conven-
tion and the 1997 European Convention. Both conventions strictly circumscribe the 
situations in which states are allowed to deprive persons of their nationality. While 
these limitations on state sovereignty may be welcomed, it should be highlighted 
151 These two strategies are interrelated since the right to a nationality implies the right of each indi-
vidual to acquire, change and retain a nationality: see https ://www.ohchr .org/EN/Issue s/Pages /Natio nalit 
y.aspx (accessed 11 October 2018).
152 The 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to state succes-
sion has so far only been ratified by 3 states.
153 Arts. 1(4) and 2 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961); and Art. 6(2) of the 
European Convention on Nationality (1971).
154 Art. 4.
155 Art. 5(1).
156 Gibney (2017), pp. 359–360. See also Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission—Partial Award: Civilian 
Claims—Eritrea’s Claims 15, 11, 23 and 27–32 (2004) Reports of International Arbitral Awards No. 16, 
pp. 195–247.
157 Art. 15(2).
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that in these limited circumstances states are allowed to deprive persons from their 
nationality, even if it would leave them stateless. When comparing the deprivation 
grounds in both conventions, both contain various grounds that refer to situations in 
which one can seriously question the person’s commitment, and loyalty to the state, 
such as ‘conducting oneself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests 
of the state’, and ‘voluntary service in another military force’.158 The possibility to 
deprive nationality on such grounds has received renewed attention in the current 
fight against terrorism.159
The European Convention on Nationality also allows deprivation of nationality 
in cases where the strength of the link between the individual and the state is con-
sidered to become too weak.160 The latter of course ties in with the approach one 
takes to dual or multiple nationality, which is also informed by the current reality of 
a mobile world in which people often migrate to other countries and develop close 
connections with more than one state, thus multiplying the situations in which per-
sons have or seek to have and retain multiple nationalities.161
As in relation to the acquisition of nationality, also in relation to nationality dep-
rivation, international law increasingly identifies constraints imposed on state sover-
eignty by the prohibition of discrimination.162 The ongoing importance of this par-
ticular constraint is confirmed by the various tragic examples where discriminatory 
deprivation/denial of nationality has been meted out to minorities, making them ever 
more vulnerable in the process, marginalizing them. The denationalization of the 
Jews as component part of the plan to exterminate them during the holocaust163 is 
undoubtedly one of the most vicious examples. The current plight of the Muslim 
community in Myanmar shows how topical concerns about discriminatory depriva-
tion of nationality remain.164
4.4  Dual Nationality
The approach towards dual nationality confirms and highlights the interrelation 
between the rationale of nationality, the special bond of membership it reflects, and 
conditions for acquisition and deprivation. Indeed, the demands one has regard-
ing the degree of loyalty and commitment to the state that is supposed to underlie 
a bond of nationality, informs the extent to which one would accept dual or even 
158 Art. 8(3) of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961); Art. 7(c) and (d) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Nationality (1971).
159 See also van Waas and Jaghai (2018) in this special issue which highlights the problems involved, 
especially in relation to persons with double nationality.
160 Art. 7 (a)(e).
161 See also below and Wautelet (2018) in this special issue.
162 Art. 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961); and Art. 6 of the 1997 European 
Convention on Nationality.
163 Sands (2016), p. 166.
164 Advisory Committee on Rakhine State, Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the Peo-
ple of Rakhine, Final Report (2017), pp. 29–31.
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multiple nationalities (which is reflected in the regulation on acquisition and depri-
vation of nationality).
Traditionally dual nationality was considered an anomaly because the legal bond 
of nationality between an individual and the state was considered exclusive and 
indissoluble, reflecting perpetual allegiance and loyalty.165 In the meantime, and 
particularly since the 1980s the conceptualisation of citizenship and nationality has 
changed, translating into a growing tendency to accept dual nationality.166 A variety 
of reasons have been identified to explain this shift,167 but what seems to play a 
significant role is the current reality of a mobile world, in which people migrate to 
other states than their state of origin and nationality. The new patterns of belonging 
that thus emerge facilitate the acceptance that one can have loyalties to more than 
one state. The expansion of communication channels furthermore makes it easier to 
be a functional citizen in both/more countries.168 Also strategic considerations come 
into play, both for the state of origin and the state of residence: the former seeks to 
accommodate its own nationals abroad who want to maintain ties and the latter is 
influenced by changing notions of what will optimize integration of migrants into 
the state of residence.169
As is further elaborated in the other articles in this special issue, dual national-
ity raises additional thorny questions in relation to the exercise of diplomatic pro-
tection,170 and whether this more open attitude towards dual nationals does not 
facilitate so-called instrumental citizenship (for example in the world of Olympic 
sports).171
5  Some Concluding Observations
The preceding analysis has revealed how the changing spatialities of citizenship cul-
minated in a focus on the nation-state, and the emergence of legal citizenship or 
nationality, reflecting the legal bond between an individual and a state. It was also 
noted that in several respects the parameters of nationality keep changing. More par-
ticularly, four developments have been highlighted that circumscribe the sovereign 
right of states to determine who are their nationals, both legally and through de facto 
pressures. First, as was emphasized in this contribution, and is taken up in several 
other articles in this special issue, the expanding human rights paradigm does not 
only increasingly detach rights from nationality (status), but also constrains the sov-
ereign choices made in relation to the conferral and deprivation of nationality, not 
in the least through the prohibition of discrimination. Secondly, and relatedly, the 
165 Spiro (2017), pp. 622–623.
166 Sejersen (2008), p. 534.
167 Spiro (2017), pp. 622, 630; Sejersen (2008), pp. 538–542.
168 Sejersen (2008), pp. 538–539.
169 Sejersen (2008), p. 542.
170 See Denza (2018) in this special issue.
171 Spiro (2017), p. 623. See also Wollmann (2018) in this special issue.
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recognition of a right to a nationality, and the ensuing standards and policies aimed 
at ending statelessness add to these constraints. Thirdly, the development of other 
significant citizenships, more particularly EU citizenship, that interact with national-
ity, de facto pushes states towards a more harmonized approach in relation to nation-
ality issues. Last but not least, the reality of the mobile world—characterized by 
rising migration—leads to pressing questions of how to optimize the inclusion of 
migrants (that are there to stay) as full members of the state. These migrant commu-
nities and their transnational connections challenge the traditional understanding of 
belonging, commitment and loyalty. This in turn affects both the way in which birth-
right citizenship is conceived (with systems of ius sanguinis increasingly including 
elements of ius soli), and the requirements for naturalisation.
At the same time, the analysis confirmed that even when the human rights para-
digm increasingly detaches rights from nationality, nationality still matters, greatly, 
as is also confirmed by the relentless fight against statelessness and the restrictions 
imposed on deprivations of nationality. Indeed, nationality is still essential for the 
keystone rights of entry and residence that are prerequisites for the effective enjoy-
ment of the other rights. Similarly, only nationals have full voting rights, and thus 
truly participate in the governance of the polity.
The parameters of nationality will continue to shift, partly in response to the cur-
rent reality of a mobile world, where persons, through migration, often have special 
bonds with more than one state, and partly in response to intersecting citizenships 
linked to multi-level governance. Some of these developments are already becom-
ing visible, such as the trend to increasingly detach voting rights from nationality. 
Other changes, such as those in response to the on-going migration and asylum cri-
sis, remain to be seen.
6  The Special Issue on Nationality and International Law
Having provided the overarching framework for the special issue, the (other) articles 
making up the special issue can be briefly introduced.
Most articles are concerned with on-going developments and debates in pub-
lic international law concerning nationality, and deal more particularly with ques-
tions of access to nationality (status) and deprivation of nationality, and protection 
mechanisms contingent on nationality. In the process, questions of how to address 
instrumental citizenship and dual nationality are also discussed. The current real-
ity of multi-level governance, and the related intersecting levels of membership are 
particularly picked up in relation to EU citizenship. The growing prominence of the 
equality principle in these respects, and more particularly the constraints on state 
sovereignty by the prohibition of discrimination in relation to questions of acquisi-
tion and deprivation of nationality is a recurring theme throughout these articles. 
Another theme that features regularly in this special issue concerns the implications 
of the new reality of the mobile world, and the related multiplication of migration 
patterns, for one’s understanding of nationality and its implications in (international) 
law.
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No less than four articles concern (particular aspects of) the acquisition 
of nationality. David Owen’s article ‘On the Right to have Nationality Rights: 
Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights’ critically analyses the extent to 
which international law protects a right to have a nationality. The extent to which 
choices in terms of nationality issues still constitute the last bastion of state sov-
ereignty are obviously a key consideration. He emphasises the crucial importance 
of this right to a nationality, while drawing extensively on the equality principle, 
but also identifies various flaws as to the implementation of this right.
René de Groot and Olivier Vonk discuss in their article the global trends 
regarding the two main systems of acquisition of nationality by birth, namely 
ius soli and ius sanguinis. The article by Iseult Honohan and Nathalie Rougier 
continues the focus on global birth right citizenship laws but adds an important 
focus, more particularly the extent to which these systems realise the inclusion of 
persons with a migrant origin.
Sabrina Wollmann’s article may at first sight have a very specific focus on 
‘Recent trends in Nationality Requirements in Olympic Sports’, it actually picks 
up an important question, namely the extent to which nationality can be acquired 
when this is (predominantly) for instrumental reasons. This obviously ties in with 
the discussion of the underlying rationale of nationality, which also underlies the 
systems of birth right nationality.
In his article for this special issue, ‘The Next Frontier: Dual Nationality as 
a Multi-Layered Concept’, Patrick Wautelet identifies the shifts over time in the 
baseline approach of international law regarding dual nationality, while calling 
for a further differentiation in that approach, more particularly considering the 
different strength of the ties one has with the respective states concerned. The 
particular position of dual nationals is also focused upon in the article by Laura 
van Waas and Sangita Jaghai, in which they problematize that dual nationals are 
differently and disproportionately affected by the recent measures states adopt to 
deprive persons (suspected from) having engaged in terrorist activities from their 
nationality.
Helen Oosterom-Staples’ article ‘The Triangular Relation between Nationality, 
EU citizenship and Migration in EU Law: A Tale of Competing Competences’ 
addresses the related instance of multiple, intersecting memberships, status and 
rights. Her discussion confirms the central importance of entry and residence 
rights (translating into ‘intra-EU mobility’ rights) to effectuate membership. Her 
analysis furthermore reveals how de facto pressures flowing from membership 
in a supranational organization ‘guide’ states’ sovereign choices in relation to 
nationality issues, where she points to an informal harmonisation process, bring-
ing the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality in the Member States 
closer together.
Eileen Denza’s article zooms in on one of the protection mechanisms that are 
contingent on nationality, namely diplomatic protection. She provides a comprehen-
sive account of diplomatic protection, including its meaning, the interrelation with 
human rights (protection mechanisms), and the specific position of dual nationals 
and EU citizens.
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The final article is by Teun Struycken and has a private international law dimen-
sion. Struycken analyses the reduced significance of nationality/legal citizenship as 
connecting factor while zooming in on religious family law, and taking due account 
of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CJEU.
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